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This symposium of three articles originated at the 2008 American Society for Public Administration (ASPA) National Conference Founders' Forum panel called "Transformations in Public Law." It has been apparent for some time that public law has taken a back seat to public management in both research and practice. Administrative Theory & Praxis has critiqued new public management; however, linkages between public administration (PA) theory and public law have yet to be explored in any depth. The articles in this symposium view public law from different theoretical perspectives and critically address recent transformations in government that minimize the role of law. What becomes apparent from using this approach is that public management divorced from its foundation in public law is based on a distorted set of norms and values. Moe and Gilmour reminded us more than 10 years ago that "the protective purposes of the framers' separated-institutions design has been eroded with respect to all three fundamental functions of government (legislative, executive, and judicial) in virtually every realm of federal policy making" (1995, p. 136) . Each of the articles in this symposium focuses on these fundamental functions and the effects of erosion on our constitutional design and on democracy.
The first article, by Michael W. Spicer, situates public law in the idea of value pluralism. He uses Stuart Hampshire's observations about moral reasoning to argue that where incommensurable values come into conflict with each other, an instrumental rationalist approach can provide little, if any, help for administrative decision-making. In fact, it diverts discussion about different conceptions of the good and the social procedures developed by men and women over time to deal with the conflicts that inevitably arise among them. What these procedures have in common is the norm of fairness, as expressed in the custom of hearing the other side of a dispute. Law provides what is, perhaps, the most self-conscious and formal expression of the norm of procedural justice:
"hear the other side." Legislative assemblies as well as judicial tribunals reach decisions in spite of opposing opinions. Consensus is the exception. Moreover, legal reasoning is based on analogical arguments; the fact pattern in one case is similar to a previous case, which provides support for a conclusion. Differences can, and do, arise about the strength of an analogy.
Analogical or legal reasoning fits well with value pluralism, and Spicer recommends it to public administrators. For those who are familiar with his previous writing, this line of thought is consistent with his rejection of value monism or purposive association:
A purposive association is a type of political association in which individuals recognize themselves as united or bound together for the joint pursuit of some coherent set of substantive purposes or ends. Individuals within such a state acknowledge themselves and their actions as instrumental to the attainment of the purposes of the state. (Spicer, 2001, p. 14) A purposive association, enterprise association, or other form of planned social order rejects the idea of value pluralism. As Spicer pointed out, the key to reinventing government is the "central argument that the activities of government can and should be organized and directed around some coherent set of clearly defined substantive ends or missions" (2001, p. 5). The emphasis in recent years on the need for mission-driven government leads chief executives to assume a greater role in defining what the law means. This expansion in the role of the chief executive has the potential to diminish the function of the legislative branch, because its "trump card" is the unified vision of a strong president. There is a good reason why the reinventing government movement replaces public law with techniques of results-oriented governance: Legislation reflects value pluralism in its substantive policy objectives, as well as procedures for introducing multiple and conflicting values into administrative rulemaking.
The second article, by Larry S. Luton, explains what happens when the unified vision of a strong president conflicts with legislative intent in the context of administrative rulemaking. He traces the rise of the administrative presidency in which elected chief executives influence the design of agency rules, a responsibility delegated by the legislative branch directly to the heads of administrative agencies. Luton calls this phenomenon the reinterpretation of statutes by the chief executive. Strong presidents from both political parties have assumed authority to manage agency rulemaking in pursuit of their policy agendas. This trend has clear implications for the Framers' separatedinstitutions design, as well as what Spicer identified as the social institutions used to adjudicate among conflicting values. Luton views these social institutions from a different theoretical perspective, however, one based on Richard Rorty's description of law as a paradigmatic project of social cooperation:
Administrative presidency strategies that include attempts to change major social policy without changing statutes undermine the social cooperation needed to legitimate decisions about major social policy. Though we may sympathize with an administration regarding the challenges they face in getting major policy changes through Congress, that remains the established, socially cooperative way to institutionalize major social policy.
The third article, by Christine M. Reed, examines the changing role of the federal courts in ordering institutional reform. In the 1970s, federal judges issued remedial orders against state public institutions for persons with developmental disabilities, forcing changes in staffing rations and treatment programs. In the 1980s, however, states began to exercise an option under federal Medicaid law to waive program rules and use a portion of institutional funds for home and community-based services. Federal law gives states discretion to limit the scope and nature of these services. As a result, many families are trying to care for their sons and daughters with little or no support from the state, a problem leading to social isolation of individuals within their communities because their disabilities require assistance with mobility and health maintenance. Reed argues that this dilemma is the result of a jurisprudence of rights, in which the concern is to free the individual from confinement by the state.
The Supreme Court's 1999 olmstead decision found that isolation from one's community in a public institution is a form of discrimination against people with developmental disabilities; however, the Court declined to order fundamental changes to the Medicaid program, and the lower federal courts have been reluctant to order states to spend more money to move people off waiting lists for services. Just the opposite has happened in that federal judges have approved settlement agreements between families and state defendants leading to modest expansion of "waiver" services. In fact, one case in Nebraska seems to point to judicial deference to top-down control of home and community-based services. Reed argues that one reason for judicial deference to state executive control is the legacy of the Supreme Court's Chevron decision legitimizing an expanded role for elected chief executives based on their national (or statewide) constituencies.
Both the institutional reform litigation of the 1970s and recent judicial deference to executive control exemplify a jurisprudence of rights. The first wave of court involvement stressed the individual's right to safe and adequate treatment as a matter of due process if confined by the state to a public institution. More recent cases have legitimized a utilitarian approach in which executive limits on waiver services have sacrificed the special needs of a few to the benefit of the greater number of citizens who oppose growth in government spending. Both forms of judicial involvement are based on individualism. Reed proposes a jurisprudence of community instead, based on key decisions by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in which individuals have a right to belong to their communities instead of living isolated within their communities.
Public administration theories based on value pluralism, pragmatism, and communitarian ethics have informed discussions about the law in this symposium. Each theoretical perspective on public law has resulted in a unique analysis of the managerial approach so prevalent in the field right now. Using the law as a prism through which to project PA theory leads to a number of distinct insights about the state of public administration in the early twentyfirst century. It is the hope of the symposium authors that their articles will stimulate further discussion about the linkages between PA theory and public law. The singular focus on managerial reform that is so prevalent in the public administration literature reflects a negative view of public law as constraining executive policy initiative. The authors of this symposium, however, share a conviction that noninstrumental approaches to public law are essential to preserving our constitutional democracy.
